The Failure of the One & Many Argument of Van Til

By: Jay

The so-called argument from the one and the many is a hallmark aspect of classical Van Tillian apologetics. Having studied this school for the last ten years, I am very acquainted with its methodology and published works. However, once one moves into patristics and Catholic and Orthodox theology, and then into other religious philosophies, the argument as constructed in writers like Van Til, Rushdoony and Bahnsen no longer works. This is not to say, however, that the argument has no relevance: on the contrary, in my estimation, it still retains its strength as a powerful signpost pointing to the Personal God of the Bible. However, I don’t think it proves the Trinity. 

There are two reasons the one and many argument doesn’t to prove the Trinity. For one, Van Til wasn’t the first to reason in this regard: many earlier Christian thinkers and church fathers had argued along similar lines, such as Origen, Irenaeus, Basil and the Cappadocian, Maximus the Confessor, and others even in other religions, as we see in the Coomaraswamy article on Vedic Exemplarism. What is interesting in Maximus though, is that from the created one and many we experience, it does not prove or point to a single divine ousia and three Persons, but rather a single rational Principle of God – the Logos, the second Person of the Trinity, in whom all the many logoi, or rational principles/meanings of things are united. So for Maximus, drawing on Origen, the many logoi are one in the one Logos of God. This argument arose historically in the context of Hellenic Christianity borrowing the Logos idea, and was transformed into an argument for the necessity of creation through the Logos. In other words, the one and many argument is an argument centered in divine exemplarism. Read more of this post

Maximus, Sartre, and the Dialectic of Time-existence

Jay

Sartre explained that the average man hides behind masks and sustains himself on a kind of false existence of wearing masks and role-playing. Nietzsche said much the same of the masses. It is hard to deny this to be the case. The ancient pre-socratic philosophers alternated within this same dialectic, too, with Heraclitus claiming all reality was constant flux and Parmenides rebutting that all reality was actually permanence. These are two sides of the same dialectic found in post-lapsarian time-existence.

What occurred to me was that these pre-Socratics were looking for an ultimate impersonal ontological grounding, while the modern existential philosophers were concerned with this issue anthropologically and socially. When one thinks of Sartre’s man who steps forward to dispell the viscous, as he calls it, and begins to be being-for-itself, one of his characters ends in suicide.  The ultimate act of chaos, change, and rejection of the permanent.  Someone like the rock star comes to mind.  (But isn’t this just a role as well? Yes, it is.)  On the other hand, you have the masses, dumbed down as obeisant sheep who follow blindly whatever Übermensch comes along.  In other words, same dialectic protracted through the history of philosophy. Read more of this post

Problems in Thomistic Epistemology

By: Jay

Plato, Philo, Plotinus, Dionysius, Augustine, Basil, John of Damascus, Maximus the Confessor, Isaac the Syrian, John Scotus, Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure and many others all profess a doctrine of divine exemplarism.  This is Plato’s forms or universals or logoi as located in the divine mind or essence (depending on whether it’s Eastern or Western). The problem will be, however, whether this can work as an epistemic foundation in Thomism.

It should go without saying that both Aristotle and Aquinas’ epistemology is basically an empirical method. A certain Thomist fussed to me about this, since “epistemology” and “empiricism” are anachronisms. As if we cannot use modern terms that accurately describe an ancient belief or system.  No one says we cannot say “Post-Apostolic theology” because that term wasn’t used in the Post-Apostolic era.  But it’s quite simple to show Aristotle and Thomas’ method is empirical. 

Aristotle says in De Anima 12:8:

“Since according to common agreement there is nothing outside and separate in existence from sensible spatial magnitudes, the objects of thought are in the sensible forms, viz. both the abstract objects and all the states and affections of sensible things. Hence (1) no one can learn or understand anything in the absence of sense, and (when the mind is actively aware of anything it is necessarily aware of it along with an image; for images are like sensuous contents except in that they contain no matter.

Aquinas writes in De Veritate, Article III:

“19. Nothing is in the intellect that was not previously in sense. But in God there is no sensitive cognition, because this is material. Therefore, He does not know created things, since they were not previously in His sense. Read more of this post

Why the Eastern View of the Eschaton Makes More Sense

“He, the Eternal King, recapitulates everything in himself” (Adversus haereses, III, 21,9)

By: Jay Dyer

For a long time I assumed that the Eastern notions of the eschaton sounded universalist and heretical. This was based on my staunchly Latin view of the eternal state, based in turn on what I had accepted as understood in the Augustinian and medieval milieu.  I want to thank Steven Kaster for taking the time to explain things to me much better. When I first read “River of Fire” by Kalomiros, I was struck by how unbiblical it sounded. It still does to me.  Kalomiros proposes that no one has understood what “justice” means in the west. That’s hard to accept.

As I read further, I encountered Isaac the Syrian and Basil in more depth, as well as soaking in St. Maximus, Von Balthasar and others, and the Nyssan-Maximian notions of perpetual progress in the eschaton.  More recently, reflection upon Anslem’s ideas of the meaning of the atonement have become increasingly ridiculous, too. Pope Benedict XVI wrote of how incoherent this view was back in 1968 in Introduction to Christianity, sharing many of the standard Eastern criticisms of the Latin ideas.  This is also the basis for the controversial Vatican Declaration on Limbo from a few years ago.  And you can see from its footnotes it’s relying on Eastern Fathers.  Read more of this post

MP3 – Review of Benedict’s “Introduction to Christianity” (4 pts.)

In this second episode, I review Benedict XVI’s scholarly Introduction to Christianity and elucidate it’s Eastern emphasis, as well as the influence of Maximus the Confessor and the Logos/logoi exemplarism, Greek philosophy and Hellenism, epistemology and problems in Thomism, as well as Benedict’s refutation of the Anselmian (and by extension, classical Protestant) view of the Atonement via Cur Deus Homo.

Read more of this post

St. Maximus on the Fulfillment of Desire in the Eschaton via Energies

“The soul’s salvation is the consummation of faith. This consummation is the revelation of what has been believed. Revelation is the inexpressible interpénétration (τιεριχώρησις) of the believer with (or toward, προς) the object of belief and takes place according to each believer’s degree of faith. Through that interpénétration the believer finally returns to his origin. The return is the fulfillment of desire.

Fulfillment of desire is ever-active repose in the object of desire. Such repose is eternal uninterrupted enjoyment of this object. Enjoyment of this kind entails participation in supranatural divine realities. This participation consists in the participant becoming like that in which he participates. Such likeness involves, so far as this is possible, an identity with respect to energy between the participant and that in which he participatesby virtue of the likeness. This identity with respect to energy constitutes the deification of the saints.”

-Cap. D. 4.19, PG 90.1312A-B = Ad Thal. 59, PG 90.608C-609B; G. E. H. Palmer, Philip Sherrard and Kallistos Ware, eds., and trans., The Philokalia. The Complete Text, 5 vols. (London, 1979-), 2:239-240.

The Anthropic Cosmology of Maximus the Confessor

An excellent scholarly paper (pdf) on Maximus’ cosmology and the Logos/logoi doctrine.

St. Maximus, Van Til, Aquinas, & Logos/logoi

By: Jay Dyer

I’m posting this because the St. Maximus section is often referred to (and it’s all St. Maximus anyway). The western corollary to the Logos/logoi is “divine exemplarism.” Both are rooted in neo-platonism. The crucial difference between east and west on this point is that the East does not stick the archetypes/logoi in God’s essence, which is absurd. They are “idea” operations of God we are told, not His essence. Aquinas’ doctrine of saying they are in God’s essence leads logically to his emanationism. Do cheeseburgers really have an archetype in God’s essence? Of course not. Does God know every fact about cheeseburgers from all eternity? Of course. Furthermore, if Thomistic ADS is true, then how are all these archetypes distinguished in God’s essence? They cannot be. Is the archetype for Plato really the same as the archetype for cheeseburgers? No, and they are not in God’s essence. And by the way, if Aquinas distinguished nature and person, he wouldn’t stick the archetypes in God’s essence, which he says must be done because of ADS.

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[As Cornelius Van Til made his few steps up the mountain of God and stopped to soothe the blisters in his Dutch wooden shoes, he surveyed the scene below. Exhausted, he slumped over to fellow beginner Rushdoony. Resting on Rushdoony's cane, he perchance peered up, beyond the fog and foliage, and there, atop the highest crags, he spotted St. Maximus the Confessor staring down at him. Van Tillians, ponder ye these mysteries. -Jay] Read more of this post

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