Eternal Manifestation, Simplicity & The Uncreated Energies – Jay Dyer

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Published On February 19, 2019 » 10542 Views» By admin » Apologetics, Archives, Bible, Featured, History, Philosophy, Religion, Theology

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By: Jay Dyer

“To the philosophical objection that he was introducing a “second and lower God” beside the unique godhead, Palamas replied over and over again that no multiplicity of divine manifestations could effect the unity of God, for God is beyond the categories of whole and parts and, while in His essence always remaining unknowable, reveals Himself wholly in each energy as the living God.” (St. Gregory Palamas and Orthodox Spirituality, John Meyendorff, pg. 121).

In studying the development of Orthodox Triadology from St. Athanasius’ time onward, confusion can arise by not understanding the overall context of his opponents and their argumentation.  In fact, most are unaware the Arians who opposed St. Athanasius did not only do so on the basis of homoiousios, but even more subtly the Arians argued the Son was a product of the will or energy/operation of the Father.  As such, given the simplicity of the Father-God, there could be no real distinction between the Father and Son without introducing a division or composition.  Indeed, absolute definitional simplicity was the presuppositional basis upon which both Origen and the Arians based their objections.  This has been demonstrated in many Orthodox works, including Free Choice in St. Maximos the Confessor and God History and Dialectic by Dr. Farrell, as well as in Fr. Florovsky’s must-read essay, “St. Athanasius’ Concept of Creation.”

However, some sever a section out of context from St. Athanasius intent on implying his statements on mere divine simplicity anachronistically prove he taught the same doctrine as Aquinas and dogmatic Roman Catholicism, often termed absolute divine simplicity.   Not only is this absurd given the entire context of the anti-Arian works being intent on refuting their doctrine of Hellenic philosophic simplicity, we’ll see St. Athanasius’ “proof-text” paragraph actually refutes them as well.  From there, we will move on to looking at how the doctrine of God’s processions and manifestation developed – in precision, not in any sense the Newman style “evolution of dogma.”  St. Athanasius writes in section 22 of De Decretis:

“22. If then any man conceives God to be compound, as accident is in essence, or to have any external envelopment, and to be encompassed, or as if there is anything about Him which completes the essence, so that when we say ‘God,’ or name ‘Father,’ we do not signify the invisible and incomprehensible essence, but something about it, then let them complain of the Council’s stating that the Son was from the essence of God; but let them reflect, that in thus considering they utter two blasphemies; for they make God corporeal, and they falsely say that the Lord is not Son of the very Father, but of what is about Him. But if God be simple, as He is, it follows that in saying ‘God’ and naming ‘Father,’ we name nothing as if about Him, but signify his essence itself. For though to comprehend what the essence of God is be impossible, yet if we only understand that God is, and if Scripture indicates Him by means of these titles, we, with the intention of indicating Him and none else, call Him God and Father and Lord. When then He says, ‘I am that I am,’ and ‘I am the Lord God Exodus 3:14-15,’ or when Scripture says, ‘God,’ we understand nothing else by it but the intimation of His incomprehensible essence Itself, and that He Is, who is spoken of. Therefore let no one be startled on hearing that the Son of God is from the Essence of the Father; but rather let him accept the explanation of the Fathers, who in more explicit but equivalent language have for ‘from God?’ written ‘of the essence.’ For they considered it the same thing to say that the Word was ‘of God?’ and ‘of the essence of God,’ since the word ‘God,’ as I have already said, signifies nothing but the essence of Him Who Is. If then the Word is not in such sense from God, as a son, genuine and natural, from a father, but only as creatures because they are framed, and as ‘all things are from God,’ then neither is He from the essence of the Father, nor is the Son again Son according to essence, but in consequence of virtue, as we who are called sons by grace. But if He only is from God, as a genuine Son, as He is, then the Son may reasonably be called from the essence of God.”

If you heard my talks on St. John of Damascus’ Defense of the Orthodox Faith, you know I covered this.  There is absolutely no sense in which God is compounded, contains accidents, any form, division or composition.  The same will be true of St. Gregory Palamas as well, as he will give the same definition as St. Athanasius as to God’s simplicity.   What none of them will do, however, is give an absolute, definitional sense to divine simplicity in which all of God’s actions are synonymous and isomorphically identified with the absolutely simple essence.

Firstly, when we consider the objection of the Arians to St. Athanasius’ argument we must understand the Arians are not arguing for an essence-energy distinction as all Orthodox fathers and councils after St. Athanasius will affirm,  but that there was a real distinction in the essence of the Father and Son.  The statement signifying “something about it” was used to distinguish not Persons or energy between Father and Son, but their essence as different.  Secondly, and a point that most strongly affirms our view is that the Son is said to be not merely generated from the common essence of the Godhead (meaning He generated Himself, as well as the Holy Spirit generated the Son since they all share the same essence), but that the Son is eternally generated from the Father’s essence.

Furthermore, not even Roman Catholics think the Son generated Himself, which is completely absurd, yet the fallacious Roman apologetic misuse of this passage is so ridiculous it actually means the common essence of the Godhead generated the Son.  This is precisely the root of the critique of all Orthodox against Roman Catholic views on this matter as they replace a Personal Father as the sole source, fount and Arche of the Godhead and introduce an impersonal super simple and definitional essentialism that “generates” and “spirates.”  This was the root of St. Photios’ Mystagogy long ago which called attention to this heresy and correctly located the problem in the double-hypostatic procession introducing essentialism.

Thirdly we come to the more useful section for their error, which is the attribution of Father and Son to the Divine Essence.   Not only is this an Orthodox doctrine, those who are in error are mislead by simple word usage and lack of nuance.   We have stressed many times that in order to grasp the distinction of nature and Person in God and in man, it is necessary not only to know of the terms, but also the later developments in St. Cyril’s dispute with Nestorius.  One of the crucial Cyrillian and Orthodox ideas that emerged from the dispute was the mode or tropos in which nature exists.  Because we do not introduce impersonalism or essentialism in to our theology it’s crucial to understand that the mode in which nature exists is in personsen hypostasis – or enhypostatized.

In Patristic theology this eventually becomes dogmatized after Ephesus and the statement is true of both God and man (and angels, too be precise).  Both God and man’s natures exist only in the mode of Persons.  This is why we don’t approach God first and foremost as simple essence or substance or monad or abstracted nature, but as Father – as divine Person.  However, does that mean it is incorrect to speak of God as “one,” “monad” or “Existence,” or “Supreme Nature,” etc.?  Of course not, and the Fathers commonly do so.  Indeed, if I were to speak in this way: “Jay Dyer is nothing but an example of human nature,” I would be making a correct statement – that I am nothing but an example of human nature.

While distinctions can be made between my common humanity I share with all others and that I am a singular person “Jay,” the mode in which nature exists in me is hypostatic – as a Person.  In God, the Fathers argue, there is a similarity, except that God is one in nature and Three in Person.  As we will see, St. Basil uses this very analogy in his letters.  So given that in God the divine Nature exists in the mode of Persons and given the doctrine of perichoresis, and given that each Divine Person is wholly divine, there is nothing wrong with saying “When we speak of the Son, we Name nothing other than the Divine Nature,” we are speaking of enhypostatization as St. Cyril would later term it.  However, that statement is not an absolute, isomorphic identification, obviously, as the strict identification would lead to modalism or Sabellianism.  We also note that St. Athanasius correctly affirms in the next sentence the doctrine of God’s essence or nature being unknowable – apophatic theology.

Beyond that, some who are new to the topic might be surprised to learn that St. Gregory of Palamas affirmed the energies of God are also fully and wholly the divine Nature, too.  It is a misunderstanding of Orthodox theology and terminology to assume 1) that distinction implies division or composition, or that 2) the uncreated energies are not fully divine and do not fully and wholly contain God.  Indeed, not only is this obvious from the doctrine of Perichoresis, but also from the fact that the unity of God is in no way severed or compartmentalized.   When we speak of the ability of God to manifest truly and really in time in space in an Theophany or in the Incarnation or in one His operations, we simply do not set up a definitional opposition or dialectic.

All our opponents and all the heretics of councils past do and did.  Whether it was the Origenists and their simplicity doctrines from Plato resulting in a dialectic between movement and stasis, or Nestorius and his dialectic between the Son of God and Jesus of Nazareth or the monothelites and their dialectical tension between God’s will and the human will, all heresies are premised on this underling presupposition of definitional oppositions.  What is amazing is that every solid work of modern Orthodox theology, from Fr. Florovsky to Fr. Staniloae to Lossky all hammer this point home ad nauseam and even many in the Orthodox world don’t grasp it or see its import.  In summation, I want to reiterate that there is nothing wrong with saying the Son is the Divine Nature, as is the Father, to demonstrate the equality of Persons, so long as we understand the Father and Son are truly distinct and that the Divine Essence is not a modalistic black hole that negates all distinctions.  That is precisely what absolute divine simplicity does, as the Catholic Encyclopedia makes clear:

“It is true that no single predicate is adequate or exhaustive as a description of His infinite perfection, and that we need to employ a multitude of predicates, as if at first sight infinity could be reached by multiplication. But at the same time we recognize that this is not so — being repugnant to the Divine simplicity; and that while truth, goodness, wisdom, holiness and other attributes, as we conceive and define them express perfections that are formally distinct, yet as applied to God they are all ultimately identical in meaning and describe the same ultimate reality — the one infinitely perfect and simple being.

Indeed, Divine knowledge itself is really identical with Divine essence, as are all the attributes and acts of God; but according to our finite modes of thought we feel the need of conceiving them distinctly and of representing the Divine essence as the medium or mirror in which the Divine intellect sees all truth. Moreover, although the act of Divine knowledge is infinitely simple in itself, we feel the need of further distinctions — not as regards the knowledge in itself, but as regards the multiplicity of finite objects which it embraces. Hence the universally recognized distinction between the knowledge of vision (scientia visionis) and that of simple intelligence (simplicis intelligentiae), and the famous controversy regarding the scientia media. We shall briefly explain this distinction and the chief difficulties involved in this controversy.”

In the Roman Catholic absolute divine simplicity sense the distinctions in God aren’t real because distinction, in their philosophic minds, must entail division or composition.  We see that this is not the position St. Athanasius is outlining, since the simplicity referred to in the Thomistic/dogmatic position of Rome negates any possibility of real distinctions in God, which logically leads to Eunomianism or Sabellianism.  In fact, even the Catholic Encyclopedia notes this about another radical proponent of Arianism that followed upon Arius and battled St. Basil and St. Gregory of Nyssa – Eunomius.  The only difference between the Roman Catholic ADS adherent and Eunomius is that Eunomius is more consistent with the logical conclusions of the assumptions of definitional, absolute simplicity, if you claim to in any sense know God and also affirm that all His attributes and actions are identical and eternal and the same as the essence:

“The dogmatic system of Eunomius is characterized at once by its presumptuous dialectics and its shallowness. His errors concerning Christ are founded upon his erroneous theodicy, which involves the assertion that a God of simplicity cannot be a God of mystery at all [note that the ADS adherents do this very thing – argue dialectics and that there is no way for God to be both one and have distinctions at once as it ‘violates the law of non-contradiction.’ -Jay] for even man is as competent as God to comprehend simplicity [here the are more consistent than ADS proponents since they understand that even an analogical statement about the divine essence, if ADS is true, still requires actual definitional knowledge]. Eunomius proclaims the absolute intelligibility of the Divine Essence: “God knows no more of His own substance, than we do; nor is this more known to Him, and less to us: but whatever we know about the Divine substance, that precisely is known to God; on the other hand, whatever He knows, the same also you will find without any difference in us” (Socrates, Church History IV.7). Agennesia, he maintains, perfectly expresses the Divine Essence: as the Unbegotten, God is an absolutely simple being: an act of generation would involve a contradiction of His essence, by introducing duality into the Godhead [Note here the crucial example – the foolish misunderstanding of the Roman Catholic ADS proponents would have Eunomius and St. Athanasius saying the same thing – that we can affirmatively name the divine essence in a definitional sense!  The only difference is the Roman Catholic ADS proponents want to define it as “Son,” “Simple,” etc., while Eunomius wants to define it as “Unbegotten.”  The lunacy resides in the fact that both systems contradict themselves. My argument against Thomists is not that they are never correct on some matters, but that the doctrine contradicts itself in many places. The Father is agennetos, the Son gennetos; hence, he held, there must be diversity of substance. The general line of his sophistical reasoning against Catholics was as follows: You allow agennesia to be a Divine attribute. Now the simplicity of God excludes all multiplicity of attributes. Consequently agennesia is the only attribute which befits the Divine nature, the only one therefore essential to Him. In other words, God is essentially incapable of being begotten. Hence it is folly to speak of a God begotten, of a Son of God. The one God, agennetos and anarchos, unbegotten and without beginning, could not communicate His own substance, nor beget even a consubstantial Son; consequently there could be no question of identity of substance (homoousios) or of likeness of substance (homoiousios) between the Father and the Son. There could be no essential resemblance (kat ousian), but at most a moral resemblance. for the Son is a being drawn forth from nothing by the will of the Father, yet superior to all Creation inasmuch as He alone was created by the One God to be the Creator of the world. He does not share in the incommunicable Divine Essence (ousia), but he does partake in the communicable Divine creative power (energeia), and it is that partaking which constitutes the Son’s Divinity and establishes Him, as regards creation, in the position of Creator: and as the principle of paternity in God is not the ousia but the energeia, the sense in which the term Son of God may be used is clear.”

The idiocy of the Roman Catholic fanatics knows no bounds, as the refutation of Eunomius from St. Basil and St. Gregory Nyssa relies, not on denying the essence-energy distinction, but in formulating it!  And not only that, the theological implications for both the sacraments (at Ephesus with St. Cyril) and Christ (at the 6th council) would be expounded following this line of argumentation concerning the uncreated energies.  There is no other way to be Orthodox and hold to proper Christology, than to understand in the Incarnation His human nature was raised by the Uncreated energy, just as the sacraments are empowered by this same divine uncreated power.

That power is obviously not the Divine Essence itself.  Indeed, the Catholic Encyclopedia even admits the error of Eunomius was that the Son only participates in a Divine Energy, showing an admission of the essence-energy distinction, while failing to admit Ss. Basil and Gregory refute Eunomius by explicating and defining the essence-energy distinction, insofar as the Son shares the same energy and power as the Father and Spirit.  Before we move to St. Basil, we want to cover the point Fr. Florovsky makes in his famous paper on this topic looking at the controversy as a whole, showing that St. Athanasius was in fact one of the first Fathers to explicate the clear doctrine of the essence – energy distinction in regard to creation and the difference between God’s will and actions in relation to eternal attributes (like love or glory) and attributes that relate to creation (like providence).

This alone is enough to disprove ADS, since Origen argued absolute simplicity meant the attributes of God, to be meaningful, must be synonymous with the divine essence.  If that was the case, providence must also be eternal (since it’s just another predicate of the simple essence. If providence was eternal, then God must have an eternal creation to be provident over.   Many similar absurd arguments can also be formulated to show the stupidity of equating all the attributes, as well, such as arguing that walking on water is literally the same divine action as creating the world – which is certainly the conclusion a consistent Roman Catholic should come to if they affirm what the Catholic Encyclopedia stated, echoing all the previous dogmatic definitions of simplicity in Rome:

“…as we conceive and define them express perfections that are formally distinct, yet as applied to God they are all ultimately identical in meaning and describe the same ultimate reality — the one infinitely perfect and simple being.

Indeed, Divine knowledge itself is really identical with Divine essence, as are all the attributes and acts of God; but according to our finite modes of thought we feel the need of conceiving them distinctly…”

Fr. Florovsky blows this inane Protestant style cut and paste out of context usage of St. Athanasius out of the water, explaining the Origenist problematic – is “Creator” also a descriptor of the absolutely simple essence?:

“The case of Origen is especially significant. He also failed to distinguish between the ontological and cosmological dimensions. [Note: RC ADS proponents often do the same thing in their Filioque prooftexting nonsense, failing to distinguish the hypostatic origins of the Persons, the eternal manifestation of the Spirit and the sending of the Spirit in to the world.  Thus the Filioque and the eternal creation challenge show the root of both to be ADS] As Bolotov has aptly stated, “the logical link between the generation of the Son and the existence of the world was not yet broken in the speculation of Origen.”‘ It can be even contended that this very link has been rather reinforced in Origen’s thinking. The ultimate question for Origen was precisely this: Is it possible or permissible to think of God without conceiving Him at once as Creator? The negative answer to this question was for Origen the only de-out option. An opposite assumption would be sheer blasphemy. God could never have become anything that He has not been always. There is nothing simply “potential” in God’s Being, everything being eternally actualized. This was Origen’s basic assumption, his deepest conviction. God is always the Father of the Only Begotten, and the Son is co-eternal with the Father: any other assumption would have compromised the essential immutability of the Divine Being. But God also is always the Creator and the Lord. Indeed, if God is Creator at all- and it is an article of faith that He is Lord and Creator-we must necessarily assume that He had always been Creator and Lord. For, obviously, God never “advances” toward what He had not been before. For Origen this implied inevitably also an eternal actualization of the world’s existence [Note that above the Catholic Encyclopedia admits God’s ‘creation’ of, and knowledge of, the world is based on God’s knowledge of the eternal platonic forms in absolutely simple essence! This is an argument I make often to RCs and Thomists and not a one of them has yet grasped the point.  This again shows they have the same presuppositions as Origen!]  of all those things over which God’s might and Lordship were exercised. Origen himself used the term pantokrator, which he borrowed surely from the Septuagint. Its use by Origen is characteristic. The Greek term is much more pointed than its Latin or English renderings: Omnipotens, “Almighty.” These latter terms emphasize just might or power. The Greek word stresses specifically the actual exercise of power. The edge of Origen’s argument is taken off in Latin translation. “Pantokrator is in the first place an active word, conveying the idea not just of capacity but of the actualization of capacity.”‘ Pantokrator means just kurios the ruling Lord. And God could not be pantokrator eternally unless ta panta also existed from all eternity. God’s might must have been eternally actualized in the created Cosmos, which therefore appears to be an eternal concomitant or companion of the Divine Being [creation is thus as necessary as the divine essence – case against ADS closed.]. In this context any clear distinction between “generation” and “creation” was actually impossible-both were eternal relations, indeed “necessary” relations, as it were, intrinsic for the Divine Being. Origen was unable, and indeed reluctant and unwilling, to admit anything “contingent” about the world itself, since, in his conception, this would have involved also a certain “change” on the Divine level. In Origen’s system the eternal being of the Holy Trinity and the eternal existence of the world are indivisibly and insolubly linked together: both stand and fall together. The Son is indeed eternal, and eternally “personal” and “hypostatic.” But He is eternally begotten in relation to the eternally created world.'”

Now we see the real root issue of debate between the Arians later following a similar line of argumentation as Origen, which revolved around the simplicity of the divine essence and the necessity of a dialectical eternal creation in opposition to God, due to Origen’s assumption the “fall” was a fall from perfect unity into multiplicity.  Notice, by the way, how the ignorant apologists and opponents of our view don’t even touch all the complexity and scope of the issue like Fr. Florovsky does, and attempt to sever a paragraph here and there to dupe the simple minded.  Anyone who has put any real amount of time into researching this topic can see the absurdity already of making St. Athanasius into a proponent of ADS.  Fr. Florovsky continues:

“God is much more than just “Creator.” When we call God “a Father,” we mean something higher than His relation to creatures (Contra Arianos 1 33). “Before” God creates at all, polloi proteron He is Father, and He creates through His Son. For the Arians, actually, God was no more than a Creator and Shaper of creatures, argued St. Athanasius. They did not admit in God anything that was “superior to His will,” to huperkeimenon tes ouleseos But, obviously, “being” precedes “will,” and “generation,” accordingly, surpasses the “will” also: [Greek not included]. Of course, it is but a logical order: there is no temporal sequence in Divine Being and Life. Yet, this logical order has an ontological significance. Trinitarian names denote the very character of God, His very Being. They are, as it were, ontological names. There are, in fact, two different sets of names which may be used of God. One set of names refers to God’s deeds or acts-that is, to His will and counsel-the other to God’s own essence and being. St. Athanasius insisted that these two sets of names had to be formally and consistently distinguished. And, again, it was more than just a logical or mental distinction. There was a distinction in the reality itself. God is what He is: Father, Son, and the Holy Spirit. It is an ultimate reality, declared and manifested in the Scriptures. But Creation is a deed of the Divine will, and this will is common to and identical In all Three Persons of the One God. Thus, God’s Fatherhood must necessarily precede His Creatorship. The Son’s existence flows eternally from the very essence of the Father [exactly what I explained above], or, rather, belongs to this “essence,” ousia The world’s existence, on the contrary, is, as it were, “external” to this Divine essence and is grounded only in the Divine will. There is an element of contingency in the exercise and disclosure of the creative will, as much as His will reflects God’s own essence and character. On the other hand, there is, as it were, an absolute necessity in the Trinitarian being of God. The word may seem strange and startling. In fact, St. Athanasius did not use it directly. It would have embarassed Origen and many others, as offensive to God’s perfection: does it not imply that God is subject to certain “constraint” or fatalistic determinism? But, in fact, “necessity” in this case is but another name for “being” or essence.” Indeed, God does not “choose” His own Being. He simply is. No further question can be intelligently asked. Indeed, it is proper for God “to create,” that is, to manifest Himself ad extra. But this manifestation is an act of His will, and in no way an extension of His own Being. On the other hand, “will” and “deliberation” should not be invoked in the description of the eternal relationship between Father and Son. At this point St. Athanasius was definite and explicit. Indeed, his whole refutation of Arianism depended ultimately upon this basic distinction between “essence” and “will,” which alone could establish clearly the real difference in kind between “Generation” and “Creation.” The Trinitarian vision and the concept of Creation, in the thought of St. Athanasius, belonged closely and organically together.” 

The entire argument of St. Athanasius against the Son being a creature produced by the will of God is predicated on a real distinction between God’s essence, actions and willing.  What could be more idiotic and stupid than thinking the whole context of the argument against the Arians doesn’t matter, and all that does matter is lifting a paragraph as a prooftext?  To add insult to this injury, I also showed in a separate essay last year the confused doctrines of ADS in Roman Catholicism also lead them to posit the Spirit is a product of will!  Amazingly it’s the same argument of Arians, based on theirs and Origen’s ADS, as applied to Spirit, instead of the Son.   If anyone recalls the arguments in comments I exchanged with Erick Ybarra, this was the whole dispute, as he also lifted a similar passage from St. Athanasius to attempt to prove the Son of God is literally and isomorphically identified with the common will of God, as well as certain attributes!  I wrote:

“In Arianism because the definition of the Father as “ingenerate” divine simplicity in this case mandated, for Arius, that Paternity and ousia be synonymous (as Eunomius would later say against St. Gregory of Nyssa).  For another to be introduced would be impossible, as the distinctions would imply divisions and time intervals into the “ingenerate” Father-essence.  For both the Arian and Eunomian, the Father-essence is a Monad wholly enclosed within itself, while along with creation, this essence has emanated a secondary creation, the “Son.”  What is interesting is that St. Athanasius’ response is based on Colossians and many other texts, that the Son is the express image of the Father’s hypostasis, and this generation is from all eternity, and thus is not by will.

That generation is done by will is a lynchpin of the Arian argument and its rejection is fundamental to the Orthodox dogma that the Son is homoousios with the Father.   Inasmuch as there is one will in God, and will is a property of nature, the Father, Son and Spirit all share the same natural will.   This basic fact should be known and admitted by all, but a devastating problem arises when we come to the enshrined dogma of Rome concerning the so-called “double” procession of the Spirit – not only does Rome erroneously claim the Father-Son operate as a ‘single principle’ source, the Spirit’s spiration is said to be from the will of the Father and Son.

Traditional Catholic systematic theologian Ludwig Ott explains:

“The Holy Ghost proceeds from the will or the mutual love of the Father and Son.” (Sent. certa.). 

The Roman Catechism teaches that the “Holy Ghost proceeds from the Divine Will, Inflamed, as it were, with love (a divine voluntate veluti amore inflammata).

“Holy Ghost designates a …Divine Person, the name pneuma indicates that the Holy Ghost, through an activity of the divine will proceeds as the Principle of Divine Activity (per modum voluntatis)… the Holy Ghost proceeds as an act of love.”

The object of the Divine Will, by which the Father and Son produce the Holy Ghost is primarily that which God necessarily loves, namely the Divine Essence, and secondarily that which He freely loves, created things…”  (Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, pgs. 66-7)

If you are following the argument you can see that both Ybarra and the other clueless “apologists” are mistakenly seeking prooftexts from St. Athanasius that destroy his whole system and confuse the Hypostatic Origin, eternal manifestation and economic sending of Spirit into an unrecognizable mess, which is precisely why the entire Roman dogmatic system has collapsed into open perennialism post-Vatican 2.  To make the point even clearer, St. Athanasius proceeds to hinge his argument on these necessary Orthodox distinctions:

“In the later part of his third “Discourse” St. Athanasius discusses at great length the Arian contention that the Son has been begotten by “the will and deliberation” of the Father: {Greek not included] (111 59). These terms, protests St. Athanasius, are quite out of place in this connection. Arians simply attempt to hide their heresy under the cover of these ambiguous words. St. Athanasius suggests that they borrowed their ideas at this point from the Gnostics and mentions the name of Ptolemy. Ptolemy taught that God first thought, and then willed and acted. In a similar way, St. Athanasius contends, Arians claim that the will and deliberation of the Father preceded the generation of the Word. He quotes Asterius at this point.” In fact, however, these terms-“will” and “deliberation”-are only applicable to the production of creaturely things. Now, Arians claim that unless the Son’s existence depended upon the “deliberation” of the Father, it would appear that God has a Son “by necessity” and, as it were, “unwillingly”-anagke kei me Thelon. This kind of reasoning, St. Athanasius retorts, only shows their inability to grasp the basic difference between “being” and “acting. [Thus no ADS] God does not deliberate with Himself about His own being and existence. Indeed, it would be absurd to contend that God’s goodness and mercy are just His voluntary habit, and not a part of His nature. [Thus no ADS] But does it mean that God is good and merciful unwillingly? Now, what is “by Nature” is higher than that which is only “by deliberation” – The Son being an offspring of the Father’s own substance, the Father does not “deliberate” about Him, since it would mean “deliberation” about His own being. God Is the Father of His Son “by nature and not by will. Whatever was “created,” was indeed created by the good will and deliberation of God. But the Son is not a deed of will, like creatures, but by nature is an offspring of God’s own substance:  It is an insane and extravagant idea to put “will” and “counsel” between the Father and the Son (111 60, 61, 62).”

And:

“The Athanasian distinction between “Generation” and “Creation,” with all its implications, was already commonly accepted in the Church in his own time. A bit later, St. Cyril of Alexandria simply repeated his great predecessor. Indeed, his Thesaurus de sancta et consubstantiali Trinitate depended heavily upon the Athanasian “Discourses.”” Only instead of “will” and “deliberation,” St. Cyril spoke of Divine “energy”:  [Note here the RC ADS proponent is shown to be completely ignorant and confused. This is a devastating point] (Thesaurus, ass. 18, PG 75, 313; cf. ass. 15, PG 75, 276: [Greek not included] also ass. 32, PG 75, 564-565). And finally, St. John of Damascus, in his great Exposition of the Faith, repeated St. Cyril. “For we hold that it is from Him, that is, from the Father’s nature, that the Son is generated. And unless we grant that the Son co-existed from the beginning with the Father, by Whom He was begotten, we introduce change into the Father’s subsistence, because, not being the Father, He subsequently became the Father. For the creation, even though it originated later, is nevertheless not derived from the essence of God, but is brought into existence out of nothing by His will and power, and change does not touch God’s nature. For generation means that the begetter produces out of his essence offspring similar in essence. But creation and making mean that the creator and maker produces from that which is external, and not of his own essence, a creation which is of an absolutely dissimilar nature.” The Divine Generation is an effect of nature, tes phusikes gonimotetos Creation is, on the contrary, an act of decision and will-Theleseos ergon (De fide orth. 1 8, PG 94, 812-813). This antithesis: gonimotes and thelesis or oulesis is one of the main distinctive marks of Eastern theology.” [And that is what every Roman Catholic fails to understand or believe] It was systematically elaborated once more in late Byzantine theology, especially in the theology of St. Gregory Palamas (1296-1359). St. Gregory contended that unless a clear distinction had been made between the “essence” and “energy” in God, one could not distinguish also between 11 generation” and “creation.”” And once again this was emphasized, somewhat later, by St. Mark of Ephesus.’ It was a true Athanasian motive, and his arguments again came to the fore.

Now, the question arises: Is the distinction between “Being” and “Acting” in God, or, in other terms, between the Divine “Essence” and “Energy,” a genuine and ontological distinction-in re ipsa; or is it merely a mental or logical distinction [as the Thomists and RC proponents openly say above], as it were, kat epinoian, which should not be interpreted objectively, lest the Simplicity of the Divine Being is compromised.” There cannot be the slightest doubt that for St. Athanasius it was a real and ontological difference. Otherwise his main argument against the Arians would have been invalidated and destroyed. Indeed, the mystery remains. The very Being of God is “incomprehensible” for the human intellect: this was the common conviction of the Greek Fathers in the Fourth century-the Cappadocians, St. John Chrysostom, and others. And yet there is always ample room for understanding. Not only do we distinguish between “Being” and “Will”; but it is not the same thing, even for God, “to be” and “to act.” This was the deepest conviction of St. Athanasius.”

This is devastating to the absurd Roman Catholic attempt to misuse St. Athanasius as a proponent of absolute divine simplicity and completely refutes them.  I highly recommend reading his famous essay.  However, that is not all that needs to be said: as Fr. Florovsky notes at the end of the paper, the development of the precision of the essence-energy distinction into the Cappadocians like St. Basil is undeniable to any who have read them – and this also refutes apologists like Ybarra and Dr. Taylor Marshall.  When we look at St. Basil’s explication of the essence-energy distinction in his well-known Letter 234 we see the Orthodox doctrine clearly, even to the point of calling the equating of all the attributes as the same and synonymous as :

“Do you worship what you know or what you do not know? If I answer, I worship what I know, they immediately reply, What is the essence of the object of worship? Then, if I confess that I am ignorant of the essence, they turn on me again and say, So you worship you know not what. I answer that the word to know has many meanings. We say that we know the greatness of God, His power, His wisdom, His goodness, His providence over us, and the justness of His judgment; but not His very essence. The question is, therefore, only put for the sake of dispute. For he who denies that he knows the essence does not confess himself to be ignorant of God, because our idea of God is gathered from all the attributes which I have enumerated. But God, he says, is simple, and whatever attribute of Him you have reckoned as knowable is of His essence.

But the absurdities involved in this sophism are innumerable. When all these high attributes have been enumerated, are they all names of one essence? And is there the same mutual force in His awfulness and His loving-kindness, His justice and His creative power, His providence and His foreknowledge, and His bestowal of rewards and punishments, His majesty and His providence? In mentioning any one of these do we declare His essence? If they say, yes, let them not ask if we know the essence of God, but let them enquire of us whether we know God to be awful, or just, or merciful. These we confess that we know. If they say that essence is something distinct, let them not put us in the wrong on the score of simplicity. For they confess themselves that there is a distinction between the essence and each one of the attributes enumerated. The operations are various, and the essence simple, but we say that we know our God from His operations, but do not undertake to approach near to His essence. His operations come down to us, but His essence remains beyond our reach.”

Indeed, how foolish is it to say Providence is literally identical to the creation of the world, which are literally identical to justice and love.  Remember – this is not taking the doctrines out of context – it’s the RC dogma:

“…as we conceive and define them express perfections that are formally distinct, yet as applied to God they are all ultimately identical in meaning and describe the same ultimate reality — the one infinitely perfect and simple being.

Indeed, Divine knowledge itself is really identical with Divine essence, as are all the attributes and acts of God; but according to our finite modes of thought we feel the need of conceiving them distinctly…”

St. Basil literally says the isomorphic identification doctrine of all the attributes is foolish.  Beyond that, we need to consider the development of the terminological usage in the Fathers and councils after St. Athanasius relating Person and nature, which St. Basil explicates in Letter 38. As you can see, his examples are precisely the same explanations and examples you’ve seen me give for years – he makes the exact same argument St. John of Damascus does concerting the error of all heretics is the confusing of nature and Person:

“To his Brother Gregory, concerning the difference between οὐσία and ὑ πόστασις.

1. Many persons, in their study of the sacred dogmas, failing to distinguish between what is common in the essence or substance, and the meaning of the hypostases, arrive at the same notions, and think that it makes no difference whether οὐσία or hypostasis be spoken of. The result is that some of those who accept statements on these subjects without any enquiry, are pleased to speak of one hypostasis, just as they do of one essence or substance; while on the other hand those who accept three hypostases are under the idea that they are bound in accordance with this confession, to assert also, by numerical analogy, three essences or substances.”

St. Basil proceeds to note that the Father alone is the sole cause and Arche of the godhead and explains the relationship of the Holy Spirit to the Son – and we will see his explanation is fully in union with St. Athanasius.  I recommend reading the full letter here:

“4. Now the proper way to direct our investigation seems to me to be as follows. We say that every good thing, which by God’s providence befalls us, is an energy, of the Grace which works in us all things, as the apostle says, But all these works that one and the self same Spirit dividing to every man severally as he will. 1 Corinthians 12:11 If we ask, if the supply of good things which thus comes to the saints has its origin in the Holy Ghost alone, we are on the other hand guided by Scripture to the belief that of the supply of the good things which are wrought in us through the Holy Ghost, the Originator and Cause is the Only-begotten God; for we are taught by Holy Scripture that All things were made by Him, John 1:3 and by Him consist. Colossians 1:17 When we are exalted to this conception, again, led by God-inspired guidance, we are taught that by that power all things are brought from non-being into being, but yet not by that power to the exclusion of origination. On the other hand there is a certain power subsisting without generation and without origination, which is the cause of the cause of all things. For the Son, by whom are all things, and with whom the Holy Ghost is inseparably conceived of, is of the Father. For it is not possible for any one to conceive of the Son if he be not previously enlightened by the Spirit. Since, then, the Holy Ghost, from Whom all the supply of good things for creation has its source, is attached to the Son, and with Him is inseparably apprehended, and has Its being attached to the Father, as cause, from Whom also It proceeds  It has this note of Its peculiar hypostatic nature, that It is known after the Son and together with the Son, and that It has Its hypostasis of the Father. The Son, Who declares the Spirit proceeding from the Father through Himself and with Himself, shining forth alone and by only-begetting from the unbegotten light [This is the Orthodox doctrine of eternal manifestation that will later be explicated by St. John of Damascus, St. Gregory of Palamas and at Blachernae below.  Note that this is a clear refutation of the double-hypostatic origin heresy of the filioque] so far as the peculiar notes are concerned, has nothing in common either with the Father or with the Holy Ghost. He alone is known by the stated signs. But God, Who is over all, alone has, as one special mark of His own hypostasis, His being Father, and His deriving His hypostasis from no cause; and through this mark He is peculiarly known [There is only one cause in the Godhead, the Father and the Son does not participate in His peculiar mark! Thus, no filioque] Wherefore in the communion of the substance we maintain that there is no mutual approach or intercommunion of those notes of indication perceived in the Trinity, whereby is set forth the proper peculiarity of the Persons delivered in the faith, each of these being distinctively apprehended by His own notes. Hence, in accordance with the stated signs of indication, discovery is made of the separation of the hypostases; while so far as relates to the infinite, the incomprehensible, the uncreate, the uncircumscribed, and similar attributes, there is no variableness in the life-giving nature; in that, I mean, of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, but in Them is seen a certain communion indissoluble and continuous [divine simplicity]. And by the same considerations, whereby a reflective student could perceive the greatness of any one of the (Persons) believed in in the Holy Trinity, he will proceed without variation. Beholding the glory in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, his mind all the while recognises no void interval wherein it may travel between Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, for there is nothing inserted between Them; nor beyond the divine nature is there anything so subsisting as to be able to divide that nature from itself by the interposition of any foreign matter. Neither is there any vacuum of interval, void of subsistence, which can make a break in the mutual harmony of the divine essence, and solve the continuity by the interjection of emptiness. He who perceives the Father, and perceives Him by Himself, has at the same time mental perception of the Son; and he who receives the Son does not divide Him from the Spirit, but, in consecution so far as order is concerned, in conjunction so far as nature is concerned, expresses the faith commingled in himself in the three together.”

In fact, when St. John of Damascus explains these issues at the close of book 1 of Defense of the Orthodox Faith, he notes the economic appropriations of the Son as the “will” of the Father, as well as the eternal manifestation of the Sn exemplifying some Names and attributes, and not in any strict ontological sense of identification, as no Divine Person is a single attribute (the Spirit is not identical to the love of God, since all the Persons share the common natural attribute/operation of Divine Love. St. Athanasius had used the same terminology of calling the Son the wisdom, will and power of God).  An exposition of this section also shows the close connection between correct Triadology and understanding the doctrine of eternal manifestation is impossible without the essence-energy distinction:

“God then is called Mind and Reason and Spirit and Wisdom and Power, as the cause of these, and as immaterial, and maker of all, and omnipotent. And these names are common to the whole Godhead, whether affirmative or negative. And they are also used of each of the subsistences of the Holy Trinity in the very same and identical way and with their full significance [This refutes Ybarra and other misusing the St Athanasius quotes!] For when I think of one of the subsistences, I recognise it to be perfect God and perfect essence: [exactly the same argument as St Athanasius and coming from one of the greatest defenders of the essence-energy distinction, St. John] but when I combine and reckon the three together, I know one perfect God. For the Godhead is not compound but in three perfect subsistences, one perfect indivisible and uncompound God. And when I think of the relation of the three subsistences to each other, I perceive that the Father is super-essential Sun, source of goodness, fathomless sea of essence, reason, wisdom, power, light, divinity: the generating and productive source of good hidden in it. He Himself then is mind, the depth of reason, begetter of the Word, and through the Word the Producer of the revealing Spirit. And to put it shortly, the Father has no reason , wisdom, power, will , save the Son Who is the only power of the Father, the immediate cause of the creation of the universe: as perfect subsistence begotten of perfect subsistence in a manner known to Himself, Who is and is named the Son. And the Holy Spirit is the power of the Father revealing the hidden mysteries of His Divinity, proceeding from the Father through the Son in a manner known to Himself, but different from that of generation. [As Blachernae will say. the Son manifests the Spirit and as St John makes clear at the bottom, the Father alone is the cause as St Basil had said – thus no Filioque]. Wherefore the Holy Spirit is the perfecter of the creation of the universe. All the terms, then, that are appropriate to the Father, as cause, source, begetter, are to be ascribed to the Father alone: while those that are appropriate to the caused, begotten Son, Word, immediate power, will, wisdom, are to be ascribed to the Son: and those that are appropriate to the caused, processional, manifesting, perfecting power, are to be ascribed to the Holy Spirit. The Father is the source and cause of the Son and the Holy Spirit: Father of the Son alone and producer of the Holy Spirit. The Son is Son, Word, Wisdom, Power, Image, Effulgence, Impress of the Father and derived from the Father. But the Holy Spirit is not the Son of the Father but the Spirit of the Father as proceeding from the Father. For there is no impulse without Spirit. And we speak also of the Spirit of the Son, not as through proceeding from Him, but as proceeding through Him from the Father. For the Father alone is cause.”

And the dogmatic medieval eastern council at Blachernae correctly expounds this section and refutes the Roman Catholic misuse as follows:

“To the same, who say that the Father is, through the Son, the cause of the Spirit, and who cannot conceive the Father as the cause of the hypostasis of the Spirit — giving it existence and being — except through the Son; thus according to them the Son is united to the Father as joint-cause and contributor to the Spirit’s existence. [The dogmatic Roman definition] This, they say, is supported by the phrase of Saint John of Damascus, “the Father is the projector through the Son of the manifesting Spirit.” John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa, in Kotter, Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos II, 36 (= PG 94.849B): “He Himself [the Father], then, is mind, the depth of reason, begetter of the Word, and, through the Word, projector of the manifesting Spirit.” This, however, can never mean what they say, inasmuch as it clearly denotes the manifestation — through the intermediary of the Son — of the Spirit, whose existence is from the Father. For the same John of Damascus would not have said — in the exact same chapter — that the only cause in the Trinity is God the Father, thus denying, by the use of the word “only,” the causative principle to the remaining two hypostases. John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa, in Kotter, Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos II, 36 (= PG 94.849B) Nor would he have, again, said elsewhere, “and we speak, likewise, of the Holy Spirit as the ‘Spirit of the Son,’ yet we do not speak of the Spirit as from the Son.” Ibid., 30 (= PG 94-832B). For both of these views to be true is impossible. To those who have not accepted the interpretation given to these testimonia by the Fathers, but, on the contrary, perceive them in a manner altogether forbidden by them, we pronounce the above recorded resolution and judgment, we cut them off from the membership of the Orthodox, and we banish them from the flock of the Church of God.”

“To the same, who affirm that the Paraclete, which is from the Frather, has its existence through the Son and from the Son, and who again propose as proof the phrase “the Spirit exists through the Son and from the Son.” In certain texts [of the Fathers], the phrase denotes the Spirit’s shining forth and manifestation. Indeed, the very Paraclete shines form and is manifest eternally through the Son, in the same way that light shines forth and is manifest through the intermediary of the sun’s rays; it further denotes the bestowing, giving, and sending of the Spirit to us. It does not, however, mean that it subsists through the Son and from the Son, and that it receives its being through Him and from Him. For this would mean that the Spirit has the Son as cause and source (exactly as it has the Father), not to say that it has its cause and source more so from the Son than from the Father; for it is said that that from which existence is derived likewise is believed to enrich the source and to be the cause of being. To those who believe and say such things, we pronounce the above resolution and judgment, we cut them off from the membership of the Orthodox, and we banish them from the flock of the Church of God.”

Given this crucial distinction is completely absent in Roman Catholic dogmatic definitions (until the recent Vatican Clarification on the Filioque), what does that say for Roman Dogma?   How have such clear and necessary distinctions that date back to St. Athanasius, St. Basil and St John of Damascus been completely lost and obscured by ridiculous notions like created theophanies, created light, created grace, and countless other stupid heresies, all the way up to the present day perennialism of Vatican 2 where all religions are in a common process of participation in Christ?  Are Satanism and Luciferianism also one of the many paths to “god’?   Rather, these are all manifestations of departure from Christ and to add fuel to the fire many modern so-called Orthodox act as if there were no medieval Orthodox synods and councils mandating the views of St. Gregory Palamas and rejecting the errors of Barlaam and the Frankish-Italian West.  The doctrine of eternal manifestation is necessary because some of the divine attributes relate to creation (like being a creator and providence), while others would have manifested from all eternity, even if God had not created, such as Love or Glory.  This also show how ex nihilo creation is dogma and is one of many reasons why Origenism is condemned.  The doctrine of eternal manifestation also shows the relationship of the Son to the Spirit, which is inseparable from all eternity.

These three “levels” (for instruction’s sake) cannot and must not be confused and Orthodox theology has made this clear, even through all three contain the same Trinitarian mode St. Basil made famous: From the Father, through the Son and in the Spirit. The hypostatic origin of the Persons is from the Father alone as the Fathers make clear, is eternally manifested through the Son, and shines forth in the Spirit.   The energies of God all have their procession from the Father, through the Son and in the Spirit.  The creation of the world was done originating in the Father, occurred through the Son and is in the Spirit.  The movement of providence, as well.  Likewise, the sending of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost according to the economia is from the Father, through the Son and in the Spirit, as well.

Failure to distinguish these three levels made clear in the Orthodox fathers and in the Triads of St Gregory leads to a confusion of Persons with nature, operations with persons, will with persons, creation with creator, and on and on.  Absolute divine simplicity itself is the root of the error and until the confusion is given up, fanatical Thomists and apologists are chasing their tales in a system that has already admitted all. my arguments.  Consider the Vatican Clarification and what is admitted – not only do they recognize the Eastern Fathers (who dominate the early ecumenical councils and their theology) say what I am saying, they admit the medieval west has a different view – what irony, given this ecumenical document admits the tension precisely where I have been saying the tension remains:

“Greek theologians, too, have often struggled to find ways of expressing a sense that the Son, who sends forth the Spirit in time, also plays a mediating role of some kind in the Spirit’s eternal being and activity. Gregory of Nyssa, for instance, explains that we can only distinguish the hypostases within the Mystery of God by “believing that one is the cause, the other is from the cause; and in that which is from the cause, we recognize yet another distinction: one is immediately from the first one, the other is through him who is immediately from the first one.” It is characteristic of the “mediation” (mesiteia) of the Son in the origin of the Spirit, he adds, that it both pre­serves his own unique role as Son and allows the Spirit to have a “natural relationship” to the Father. (To Ablabius: GNO III/1, 56.3-10) In the thirteenth century, the Council of Blachernae (1285), under the leadership of Constantinopolitan Patriarch Gregory II, took further steps to interpret Patristic texts that speak of the Spirit’s being “through” the Son in a sense con­sis­tent with the Orthodox tradition. The Council proposed in its Tomos that although Chris­tian faith must maintain that the Holy Spirit receives his existence and hypostatic identity solely from the Father, who is the single cause of the divine Being, he “shines from and is manifested eternally through the Son, in the way that light shines forth and is manifest through the intermediary of the sun’s rays.” (trans. A. Papadakis, Crisis in Byzantium [St. Vladimir’s, 1996] 219) In the following century, Gregory Palamas proposed a similar interpretation of this relationship in a number of his works; in his Con­fession of 1351, for instance, he asserts that the Holy Spirit “has the Father as foundation, source, and cause,” but “reposes in the Son” and “is sent – that is, manifested – through the Son.” (ibid. 194) In terms of the transcendent divine energy, although not in terms of substance or hypostatic being, “the Spirit pours itself out from the Father through the Son, and, if you like, from the Son over all those worthy of it,” a communi­ca­tion which may even be broadly called “procession” (ekporeusis) (Apodeictic Treatise 1: trans. J. Meyendorff, A Study of Gregory Palamas [St. Vladimir’s, 1974] 231-232).

The Greek and Latin theological traditions clearly remain in some tension with each other on the fundamental issue of the Spirit’s eternal origin as a distinct divine person. By the Middle Ages, as a result of the influence of Anselm and Thomas Aquinas, Western theology almost universally conceives of the identity of each divine person as defined by its “relations of opposition” – in other words, its mutually defining relations of origin – to the other two, and concludes that the Holy Spirit would not be hypostatically distinguishable from the Son if the Spirit “proceeded” from the Father alone.”

Indeed – note as well the admission my interpretation of the medieval Latins is also accurate. And to round this off, lets consider what Palamas scholar John Meyendorff explains concerning the mystery and lack of dialectal tension in St Gregory concerning the fact that God is wholly present in His energies due to His simplicity, and yet at the same time also distinct in His energies (because distinction does not imply composition or division – but for dialectical heretics, it does). St. Gregory writes in the Triads:

 

“F. Essence and energies in God

I should like to ask this man why he claims that only the divine essence is without beginning, whereas everything apart from it is of a created nature, and whether or not he thinks this essence is all-powerful. That is to say, does it possess the faculties of knowing, of prescience, of creating, of embracing all things in itself; does it possess providence, the power of deification and, in a word, all such faculties, or not? For if it does not have them, this essence is not God, even though it alone is unoriginate. If it does possess these powers, but acquired them subsequently, then there was a time when it was imperfect, in other words, was not God. However, if it possessed these faculties from eternity, it. follows that not only is the divine essence unoriginate, but that each of its powers is also.

Nonetheless, there is only one unoriginate essence, the essence of God; none of the powers that inhere in it is an essence, so that all necessarily and always are in the divine essence. To use an obscure image, they exist in the divine essence as do the powers of the senses in what is called the common spiritual sense of the soul. 2 Here is the manifest, sure and recognised teaching of the Church! For just as there is only one single essence without beginning, the essence of God, and the essences other than it are seen to be of a created nature, and come to be through this sole unoriginate essence, the unique maker of essences—in the same way, there is only one single providential power without beginning, namely that of God whereas all other powers apart from it are of a created nature; 3 and it is the same with all the other natural powers of God. It is thus nottrue that the essence of God is the only unoriginate reality, and that all realities other than it are of a created nature.

My discourse (guided by the absolute and eternally preexisting nature) now leads me briefly to show the unbelieving that not only the divine powers (which the Fathers often call “natural energies”), but also some works of God are without beginning, as the Fathers also rightly affirm. For was it not needful for the work of providence to exist before Creation, so as to cause each of the created things to come to be in time, out of nonbeing? Was it not necessary for a divine knowledge to know before choosing, even outside time? But how does it follow that the divine prescience had a beginning? How could one conceive of a beginning of God’s self-contemplation, and was there ever a moment when God began to be moved toward contemplation of Himself? Never!

There is, therefore, a single unoriginate providence, that of God, and it is a work of God. Providences other than it are of a created nature. Nonetheless, providence is not the divine essence, and thus the essence of God is not alone unoriginate. There is in the same way only one unoriginate and uncreated prescience, that of God, whereas presciences different from it—those which we possess by nature—all have a beginning and are created. There is also only one will without beginning, that of God, whereas all wills other than it have a beginning. However, no one would dare to say that the essence of God is a will, not even those who claimed the Word of God was a son of God’s will. 6 As for predeterminations, their very name shows that they existed before creation; and should anyone wish to deny their existence before the ages, he would be refuted by Paul’s words, that “God has foreordained before the ages”.

These works of God, then, are manifestly unoriginate and pretemporal : His foreknowledge, will, providence, contemplation of Himself, and whatever powers are akin to these. But if this contemplation, providence, prescience, predetermination and will are works of God that are without beginning, then virtue is also unoriginate, for each of His works is a virtue; 8 existence is also unoriginate, since it precedes not only essence 9 but all beings, for it is the first existence. And are not will and predetermination virtues?

… The wise Maximus thus rightly says that “existence, life, holiness and virtue are works of God that do not have a beginning in time”; and he adds (so that no one should think these things relate to this age, albeit in a nontemporal sense), “There was never a time when virtue, goodness, holiness and immortality did not exist.” 11 He then makes this further observation, lest anyone should think the virtues in us are unoriginate: “Things that have a beginning exist, and are said to exist by participation in things unoriginate. For God is the creator of all life, all immortality, all sanctity and all virtue”, 12 that is, of that which subsists in us by nature. 13… Elsewhere, he states, “These virtues are contemplated as qualities appertaining essentially to God”, and are participable. 14 Created beings participate in them, as do works of God that have an origin in time, but they themselves are works without beginning. 15 “For nonbeing is not anterior to virtue,” he says, “nor to any other of the realities mentioned before, since they have God as the eternal and absolutely unique originator of their being.” 16 And so that no one should believe he is speaking of the su􏰀 peressentiality to which our intellect attains after having stripped itself of all created things, 17 he continues, “God infinitely transcends these participable virtues an infinite number of times.” 18 In other words, He infinitely transcends that goodness, holiness and virtue which are unoriginate, that is, uncreated.

Thus, neither the uncreated goodness, nor the eternal glory, nor the divine life nor things akin to these are simply the superessential essence of God, for God transcends them all as Cause. But we say He is life, goodness and so forth, and give Him these names, because of the revelatory energies and powers of the Superessential. As Basil the Great says, “The guarantee of the existence of every essence is its natural energy which leads the mind to the nature.” 19 And according to St. Gregory of Nyssa and all the other Fathers, the natural energy is the power which manifests every essence, and only nonbeing is deprived of this power; for the being which participates in an essence will also surely participate in the power which naturally manifests that essence.

But since God is entirely present in each of the divine energies,we name Him from each of them, although it is clear that He transcends all of them. For, given the multitude of divine energies, how could God subsist entirely in each without any division at all; and how could each provide Him with a name and manifest Him entirely, thanks to indivisible and supernatural simplicity, if He did not transcend all these energies? There are, however, energies of God which have a beginning and an end, as all the saints will confirm. 21 Our opponent … thinks that everything which has a beginning is created; this is why he has stated that only one reality is unoriginate, the essence of God, adding that “what is not this essence, derives from a created nature.” 22 But even if this man considers that everything that has a beginning is created, we for our part know that while all the energies of God are uncreated, not all are without beginning. Indeed, beginning and end must be ascribed, if not to the creative power itself, then at least to its activity, that is to say, to its energy as directed towards created things. Moses showed this, when he said, “God rested from all the works which He had begun to do.”

How then would the Superessential One not be different from its proper energy? But, he asks, are the unoriginate energies identical with the Superessential One? There are among them some which have an end but not a beginning, as Basil the Great has said concerning the prescience of God. 24 The superessential essence of God is thus not to be identified with the energies, even with those without beginning ; from which it follows that it is not only transcendent to any energy whatsoever, but that it transcends them “to an infinite degree and an infinite number of times”, as the divine Maximus says.

The blessed Cyril, for his part, says that the divine energy and power consist in the fact that God is everywhere and contains all, without being contained by anything. 26 But it does not follow that the Divine Nature consists in the fact of being everywhere, any more than our own nature uniquely consists in being somewhere. For how could our essence consist in a fact which is in no way an essence? Essence and energy are thus not totally identical in God, even though He is entirely manifest in every energy, His essence being indivisible.

John Chrysostom, on the other hand, says that the essential energy of God consists in being nowhere; not in the sense that it does not exist, but in the sense that it transcends place, time and nature. 27… As Basil the Great asks, “Is it not ridiculous to say that the creative power is an essence, and similarly, that providence is an essence, and foreknowledge, simply taking every energy as essence?” 28 And the divine Maximus says, “Goodness and all that the word implies, all life absolutely, all immortality, and all the attributes that appertain essentially to God are works of God, and do not have a temporal beginning. Nonbeing, that is to say, is not anterior to virtue, nor to any of the realities mentioned above, even though the beings which participate in them began to exist in time.” 29 None of these things is the essence of God—neither the uncreated goodness, nor the unoriginate eternal life; all these exist not in Him, but around Him.

Moreover, the Holy Fathers affirm unanimously that it is impossible to find a name to manifest the nature of the uncreated Trinity, but that the names belong to the energies.”The divinity” also designates an energy, that of moving or contemplating or burning, 31 or else it indicates the “deification-in-itself.” 32 But He Who is beyond every name is not identical with what He is named; for the essence and energy of God are not identical. But if the divinity of God designates the divine energy par excellence, and if the energies are, as you say, created, the divinity of God must also be created!

However, it is not only uncreated, but unoriginate; for He Who knows all things before their creation did not begin to contemplate created beings in time. But the divine essence that transcends all names, also surpasses energy, to the extent that the subject of an action surpasses its object; and He Who is beyond every name transcends what is named according to the same measure. But this is in no way opposed to the veneration of a unique God and a unique divinity, since the fact of calling the ray “sun” in no way prevents us from thinking of a unique sun and a unique light. Do you not see how strictly our views accord with those of the saints?

But as for you, you allege all that is participable is created, that not only the works, but also the powers and energies of God have a beginning and a temporal end! … You accuse of impiety and threaten with excommunication and anathema those saints who glorify God according to His essence, which exceeds even His uncreated energies, since this essence transcends all affirmation and all negation. Since you hold and teach these opinions, have you any way of proving that you are not to be classed with the heretics of past times, since you declare that not only are all the energies and all the works of God created, but even the very powers of this superessential nature?

Indeed, even this name “essence” designates one of the powers in God. Denys the Areopagite says, “If we call the superessential Mystery ‘God’ or ‘Life’ or ‘Essence’ or ‘Light’ or ‘Word’, we are referring to nothing other than the deifying powers which proceed from God and come down to us, creating substance, giving life, and granting wisdom.” 34 So, when you say that only the essence of God is an unoriginate reality, you give us to understand that only one power of God is without beginning, that which creates substance, whereas all the others apart from this one are temporal. Yet why should the substance-creating power be unoriginate, when (according to you) the vivifying power has a temporal beginning, as also the life-giving and wisdom- bestowing powers? Either all the divine powers are unoriginate, or none! If you say that only one of them is uncreated, you expel the others from the realm of the uncreated ; and if you declare all are created, you must also reject this single uncreated one. For such a falsehood is self-contradictory and inconsistent with itself! …

Perhaps he will say that it is “through the essence” that God is said to possess all these powers in Himself in a unique and unifying manner. But, in the first place, it would be necessary to call this reality “God”, for such is the term for it which we have received from the Church. When God was conversing with Moses, He did not say, “I am the essence”, but “I am the One Who is.” 36 Thus it is not the One Who is who derives from the essence, but essence which derives from Him, for it is He who contains all being in Himself.

So if, instead of speaking of “essence”, he had employed the word “God”, he would also have had to say “by nature”—and this by reason of grace and the “gods by grace”, 38 whom the saints say are “unoriginate and uncreated by grace”, when speaking on this subject. 39 Thus he should have said, “There is one God, unoriginate by nature.” But he has replaced the word “God” by another, and omitted “by nature”, so as to mislead his hearers as far as possible, and has not said that the only reality without beginning is He Who holds all things together and unifies all, yet preexists all. If this had been his meaning, why would he have made so much effort to show that the natural powers in God are created?

To convince you that this man believes the divine powers to be created, listen to his own words, which are perfectly clear. He brings forward the words of the great Denys: “The providential powers produced by the imparticipable God are Being-in-itself, Life-in-itself and Divinity-in-itself; to the extent to which created beings participate in them according to their proper mode, we can say that they are living and divine beings, and thus it can be said that the Good One has established them.”

This is what Barlaam concludes from this: “The Divinity-in-itself and the other realities which the great Denys has here clearly called powers, are not eternal, but the Good One has also granted existence to them.” And again: “A certain Father 41 has said that there is a thearchy and a divinity transcended by the Principle of the universe, but he did not say that they were eternal, since the universal Cause gave them also existence.” And also: “There is a glory of God beyond participation, an eternal reality, and thus identical to the divine essence; and there is a participable glory, different from this essence and not eternal, for the universal Cause has given it existence.”

As I said above, he who said that the angels contemplate the eternal glory—I mean St. Gregory Nazianzen 43 —has shown that it is an error to identify the eternal glory of God with the imparticipable essence of God. We have here a proof that the eternal glory of God is participable, for that which in God is visible in some way, is also participable. 44 But the great Denys has also said: “The divine intelligences move in a circular movement, united to the unoriginate and endless rays of the Beautiful and Good.” It is clear, therefore, that these unoriginate and endless rays are other than the imparticipable essence of God, and different (albeit inseparable) from the essence.

In the first place, that essence is one, even though the rays are many, and are sent out in a manner appropriate to those participating in them, being multiplied according to the varying capacity of those receiving them. 46 This is what Paul means when he speaks of “the parts of the Holy Spirit”. 47 Furthermore, the essence is superessential, and I believe no one would deny that these rays are its energies or energy, and that one may participate in them, even though the essence remains beyond participation.”

“To the philosophical objection that he was introducing a “second and lower God” beside the unique godhead, Palamas replied over and over again that no multiplicity of divine manifestations could effect the unity of God, for God is beyond the categories of whole and parts and, while in His essence always remaining unknowable, reveals Himself wholly in each energy as the living God.” (St. Gregory Palamas and Orthodox Spirituality, John Meyendorff, pg. 121).

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