“All models of reality are purely human-devised mental constructs that help us explain reality.”
Every letter in this sentence is a symbol which stands for reality. Each grouping of symbols on a higher level stands for a more specific concept. “A” combines with “L” and “L” to have a definite meaning. Meaning itself becomes a focal point of metaphysical difficulties that any empiricist must avoid like the plague. Yet the desire to avoid metaphysics because they are tough for your own faulty model is not how truth is obtained. When the three letters are combined, the concept of all models becomes clear, and when all the symbols are combined, we have a universal statement about a given state of affairs in the world. Even if this statement is to deny that we know about given sets of affairs in the world, it is still, at a base level, a factual claim about states of affairs that have obtained. On another level, it also makes a sweeping claim for a universal state of affairs.
It purports to say all human models are flawed. If all human models are flawed then one can have no linguistic philosophical basis for statements about statements themselves, inasmuch as a self-referential statement about statements is still a statement about a given state of affairs. In essence, this claim attempts to have a privileged position from which to sound humble – claiming that models of reality are only mental realities that cannot be shown to correlate to reality. Yet the action of making this statement, even if turned in on itself and analyzed as self-referential amounts to saying the following:
“All statements about models of reality are humanly devised construct models about models.”
This is nonsense from the perspective of the enlightenment rationalist that would be forced to espouse it, but it does illustrate that there is a strangeloop that occurs in these kinds of phenomena, as Douglas Hoffstadter wrote about in Godel, Escher, Bach. Kurt Godel showed in set theory that any statement about a set can only be made within set theories. One cannot find a set theory basis for set theory. It loops back upon itself – a strangeloop. But strangeloops are not only true of mathematics and useful for refuting the Bertrand Russells of the world who tell us that reality is reductionistic (that we can encompass everything in mathematics or materialism). On the contrary, what Godel said about sets is well-known for those who have studied presuppositional apologetics or who have read about worldviews or who understand Husserl’s phenomenology. In fact, it is precisely those materialistic sciencey Russell types that so dogmatically tout logic and mathematical reasoning.
And now you’ve had your ass handed to you because the logic of logic is a strangeloop. The logic of logic demonstrates that in this dimension you do not have a privileged position from which things of this nature are not self-referential. The math of math shows that numbers do correspond to reality. They are not purely human mental entities or constructs. The logic of math that Husserl sought after is precisely the fact that essences will, and must return, as Pauli said. Meaning demands telos – purpose. And that purpose demands more than a finite mind constructing all its eventualities. But it is this fact that points everything literally to an Omniscient Mind – to God. And that is what men do not want to see, and they will be tuck in the wheel of the loop of this world until they do.