Transcendental Worldview/System Analysis: A Materialist Test Case

Presuppositional Pillars

An Example from Linguistics

By: Jay

Several recent discussions I’ve had demonstrate the importance of thinking in terms of a worldview, which amounts to ultimately adopting transcendental argumentation. This is relevant, not only for apologetics and arguing for God’s existence, but for analysis in general, especially as it applies to analyzing systems of thought, be it some given community’s modus operandi or a religious system, etc. This is precisely the revolution transcendental argumentation brought, but which has largely gone unnoticed. There are many reasons for this. In the numerous debates I’ve had with thinkers, one can often detect this process, even when the opponent cannot. Once one is aware of worldview thinking and transcendental argumentation, it is truly a paradigm shift in the approach to rational discourse, be it some issue of metaphysics or morals.

What we can trace out from this is that persons operate on the basis of their presuppositions. More often than not, individuals are inconsistent with their operating principles, and hold to conflicting positions. When dealing with more intelligent individuals, this tendency is certainly decreased, yet more often than not it is still a prevalent tendency.  For example, we may look at a person who claims to be a hardcore, reductionist materialist. Irrespective of the goal of argumentation involved in engaging or analyzing this person, one can trace out the kind of conclusions they ought to come to, given their pre-commitments. Thus, for an illustrative example, a reductionist materialist will often make the universal claim that “all that exists is matter.”  This is problematic on numerous levels, not merely that it attempts to show what it cannot do in its own system. But thinking of this view as a totality system is what is key.  In other words, we trace out all the multitude implications of what would follow from adopting the foundational precondition that this person believes to be “rational.”

First of all, we consider the claim itself – that all that exists is purely material. On the first level of analysis, we can consider whether this question is possible to demonstrate, since generally those who advocate such a notion will also claim they adhere to the “scientific method.”  The scientific method, however, gives no possibility of ever demonstrating such a universal claim. One would have to demonstrate perceptual knowledge of every possible location in the universe, and further show that each locale is purely material. This is of course, impossible, but even if it were, it would not follow from some mind doing this that some locale not presently under examination does not contain something immaterial. It is impossible to demonstrate a universal negative. But rarely would any materialist go to such extremes, though I have seen some otherwise highly intelligent people jump to absurd and irrational conclusions in such worldview analyses. What usually occurs at this point is that the person concedes that his view is a hypothesis, and it is the most rational. It becomes an agnostic view.  A view, however, which admits that it’s most foundational premise is itself doubtful begins to give rise to bigger and bigger problems. Read more of this post

Language Event, Narrative Structure and God

The movement upward in this consideration as presented is fractal-esque

By: Jay 

I propose a modified form of the transcendental argument for God’s existence. Not that it’s different, but it’s an aspect to the argument I’ve never seen previous proponents take. It occurred to me while reading Alisdair MacIntyre and while considering some of what Husserl and Karl Otto Appel have said. But of course, debates get old. They get old as I get old, maybe. Anyway, the subject matter itself is still worthy of reflection, even if one chooses not to engage in debate. Didn’t debate used to be a respected art? yes. But in our INGSOC modernity, questioning is itself suspect. But to the point. 

MacIntyre points out that there is a kind of narrative structure for any meaningful conversation to take place. He makes a convincing case in his piece mentioned above. It occurred to me that for the localized instance of conversation to make sense, though, there has to be a larger narrative structure within which the localized conversation takes place. MacIntyre’s The Virtues, The Unity of a Human Life and the Concept of a Tradition gives an example along the lines of approaching someone gardening. To say a nonsense statement like “flight of the condor eats cheese wings perpetually,” has no meaning. In fact, to say even a meaningful phrase assumes some sort of context, such as, “how is the gardening coming?” or something of that nature. So why is it that we do one and not the other? Deconstructionists, relativists, nihilists, and so on, can say that it’s just utilitarian and social convention that has caused to use certain sounds in a certain way to stand for certain things, and that we evolved this way, blah blah blah. 

But this kind of simple, mundane interaction doesn’t just show a kind of appropriateness to the content of what can be said, it also evidences a narrative structure. For example, generally, such a conversation would have a greeting, middle, and climax. Granted not always per se, but even a passing hello, has a kind of narrative structure to it, with an intended meaning that one party has, that the other party receives and many or may not acknowledge. Again, the intentions obviously vary as well as the received meanings and responses, but none of this changes the loosely narrative structure of such interactions. Read more of this post

St. Maximus, Van Til, Aquinas, & Logos/logoi

By: Jay Dyer

I’m posting this because the St. Maximus section is often referred to (and it’s all St. Maximus anyway). The western corollary to the Logos/logoi is “divine exemplarism.” Both are rooted in neo-platonism. The crucial difference between east and west on this point is that the East does not stick the archetypes/logoi in God’s essence, which is absurd. They are “idea” operations of God we are told, not His essence. Aquinas’ doctrine of saying they are in God’s essence leads logically to his emanationism. Do cheeseburgers really have an archetype in God’s essence? Of course not. Does God know every fact about cheeseburgers from all eternity? Of course. Furthermore, if Thomistic ADS is true, then how are all these archetypes distinguished in God’s essence? They cannot be. Is the archetype for Plato really the same as the archetype for cheeseburgers? No, and they are not in God’s essence. And by the way, if Aquinas distinguished nature and person, he wouldn’t stick the archetypes in God’s essence, which he says must be done because of ADS.

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[As Cornelius Van Til made his few steps up the mountain of God and stopped to soothe the blisters in his Dutch wooden shoes, he surveyed the scene below. Exhausted, he slumped over to fellow beginner Rushdoony. Resting on Rushdoony's cane, he perchance peered up, beyond the fog and foliage, and there, atop the highest crags, he spotted St. Maximus the Confessor staring down at him. Van Tillians, ponder ye these mysteries. -Jay] Read more of this post

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