Some Problems for the Ontological Argument: Metaphysical, Epistemic and Theological

May 7, 2011 5 Comments

 

The great chain of being.

By: Jay

(c) copyright 

The ontological argument of Anselm of Canterbury has long since captivated the minds of many philosophers and apologists. Not long after Anselm published his Proslogion, his devotional apologetic was criticized by Gaunilo, yet Anselm’s argument was taken up by many of the West’s most prominent thinkers, such as Descartes and Leibniz, both giving their own versions. One of the strongest arguments against Anselm would be Immanuel Kant’s, who centered his objection around the notion that “being” is not a predicate.1 The purpose of this paper will be to analyze other problems, particularly theological, metaphysical and epistemological problems in the classical Anselmian formulation.

Anselm’s argument simply stated is as follows:

And certainly this being so truly exists that it cannot even be thought not to exist. For something can be thought to exist that cannot be thought not to exist, and this is greater than that which cannot be thought not to exist. Hence, if that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought can be thought not to exist, then that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought is not the same as that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought, which is absurd. Something-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought exists so truly then, that it cannot be even thought not to exist. And you, Lord our God, are this being.2

 

Plantinga gives the form of the argument as follows, arguing it is best formulated as a reductio ad absurdum argument:

 

  1. God exists in the understanding, but not in reality. (assumption for reductio)

  2. Existence in reality is greater than existence in the understanding alone. (premise)

  3. A being having all of God’s properties plus existence in reality can be conceived. (premise)

  4. A being having all of God’s properties plus existence in reality is greater than God. (from 1 and 2)

  5. A being greater than God cannot be conceived. (3,4)

  6. It is false that a being greater than God can be conceived. (by definition of ‘God.’)

  7. Hence it is false that God exists in the understanding but not in reality. (1-6 reductio ad absurdum).3 Read more of this post

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St. Tom Cat

August 16, 2010 Leave a comment

Analogia

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Lengthy Response to a Thomist

April 7, 2010 Leave a comment

N. writes:

No offense Jay, but you are operating on multiple, severely flawed groundworks. For example:

1) Thomas never taught God was like a blob of jello such that ‘Father = Son’. That is a unfair cariacture of texts like ST 1-39. You are not accepting “Father is God” is what Thomas is saying, just as if I were to say “Jay is human.”

I didn’t take anything in Thomas out of context and it’s not just question 39 where he says this. Aquinas teaches his view clearly in numerous places in the Summa, and he’s only saying what Augustine and Anselm said before him. Thomas’ scheme is a system and it all stands together.

1. God is an absolutely simple essence where will, action, attribute, generation, procession and Person are all identical to the essence. Let’s see proof of this:

For Thomas, there can be no distinctions in God, for because of Aristotelian assumptions, ALL distinction implies composition. Hence, as the famous Thomistic dictum Goes He (person) is His essence: Read more of this post

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Critique of the Protestant & Thomist Views of Absolute Divine Simplicity

April 6, 2010 Leave a comment

By: Jay Dyer 

When Taylor Marshall and crew originally fussed about this, they were content to dismiss it as “Palamism” – some form of obscure medieval Byzantine mysticism. Now, after more reflection and realizing that the Eastern Fathers all teach a distinction between essence and energy in God, it’s now become an exercise in seeing if oil and water can be mixed. I tried to do this for a while as well. Is there some way to reconcile the two? As a good buddy of mine put it the other day, if the two communions have argued against one another on this issue for hundreds of years, is it really plausible that the Church needed Mike Liccione’s bad arguments to reconcile the two? Nope.

So let’s look at some recent arguments given in attempt to both prove Thomistic absolute simplicity or reconcile it. My friend Ben follows Taylor Marshall in trying to argue that because St. John of Damascus talks about the one energy in God, somehow this is to Thomism. This is false for two reasons. First, it’s false because Thomas explicity rejects any distinction between essence and energy, and second, St. John says both that the energy of God is both one and multiple. Ben argues that this “oneness” of energy means that “in God” all actions and attributes are one and identified. Calvinist blogger Steven Wedgeworth (who won’t allows my comments) argues this here. A reading of the entire Book I is necessary to get the complete meaning of what St. John is saying, as well as Book III where St. John applies the essence – energy distinction at length to Christology. Read more of this post

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